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Political Islam and Non-Muslim Religions – A Lesson 
from Lessing for the Arab Transition 
 
 
Michael Bohlander
*
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Hardly any region has recently captured the global geopolitical imagination as much 
as the Arab world after the so-called Arab Spring and very likely no state more so 
than Egypt. Finally, it seemed that democracy was coming to the region, that this 
would spell the end of radical Islam, of any local aspirations of creating Islamic states, 
and mark the beginning of a rapprochement between East and West. This paper 
analyses and links those dynamics, with particular reference to the transition process 
in the wake of the so-called Arab Revolution, and gauge what may be at stake for 
members of non-Muslim faiths. It will particularly trace the rift between theoretical 
Muslim discourse about Islamic tolerance towards other faiths and its implementation 
or the absence thereof in practice. It will conclude that so far no real progress has 
been made and that for the relationship to evolve, Islam needs to proceed to a state of 
self-perception that sees it as a mere but full equal to other religions. The recognition 
of its tradition-based nature and of the consequences which flow from such a 
realization for the treatment of its fundamental sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah, 
will be addressed. We will use the example of a famous 18
th
 century German play by 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Nathan the Wise, about the occupation of Jerusalem by 
Saladin, to evaluate the current situation and the outlook.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
*
 Chair in Comparative and International Criminal Law, Durham Law School, and Director of the research 
group Islam, Law and Modernity (www.dur.ac.uk/ilm). – The author was the first non-Muslim legal academic to 
teach at the English department of the Faculty of Shari’ah and Law of Al Azhar University in the spring of 
2012. – All URLs cited were available as of 25 March 2013 – I would like to thank the following for providing 
comments on an earlier draft of the paper or individual issues: Anoush Ehteshami, Durham University, Javaid 
Rehman, Brunel University, Mohammad Hedayati-Kakhki, Durham University, Karl-Josef Kuschel, Tübingen 
University, David G. John, Waterloo University, and Dawn Rothe, Old Dominion University. All remaining 
errors are mine alone. 
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For each We have appointed a divine law and a traced-out way. Had Allah willed He could 
have made you one community. But that He may try you by that which He hath given you (He 
hath made you as ye are). So vie one with another in good works. Unto Allah ye will all 
return, and He will then inform you of that wherein ye differ. – Qur’an, Sura 5:48 
O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for friends. They are friends one to 
another. He among you who taketh them for friends is (one) of them. Lo! Allah guideth not 
wrongdoing folk. – Qur’an, Sura 5:511 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Hardly any region has recently captured the global geopolitical imagination as much as the 
Arab world after the so-called Arab Spring and very likely no state more so than Egypt. 
Finally, it seemed that democracy was coming to the region, that this would eventually spell 
the end of radical Islam, put paid to any local aspirations of creating Islamic states, and mark 
the beginning of a rapprochement between East and West – in short, the West breathed a 
collective sigh of relief from its fear of the Muslim radicals, a spectre which the West over 
the last two centuries had had more than a hand in creating in the first place
2
.  It may have 
exhaled too soon, because it neglected the religious-psychological dynamics of (political) 
Islam.  This paper will try to analyse and link those dynamics, with particular reference to the 
transition process in the wake of the so-called Arab Revolution, and gauge what may be at 
stake for members of non-Muslim faiths. It will particularly trace the rift between theoretical 
Muslim discourse about Islamic tolerance towards other faiths and its implementation or the 
absence thereof in practice. It will conclude that so far no real progress has been made and 
that for the relationship to evolve, Islam needs to proceed to a state of self-perception that 
sees it as a mere but full equal to other religions, and not a kind of primus inter pares. The 
need for the recognition of its tradition-based nature and of the consequences which flow 
from such a realization for the treatment of its fundamental sources, the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah, will be addressed. We will use the example of an 18
th
 century German play by 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Nathan the Wise, about the occupation of Jerusalem by Saladin, 
to evaluate the current situation and the outlook.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 Translation of both verses by Pickthall, see http://quran.com/5. 
2
 Jeremy Salt, The Unmaking of the Middle East – A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands, 2008. 
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The Road from Tahrir Square 
 
The Arab and in particular the Egyptian revolution have been hijacked by those who were not 
part of the initial demonstrations and who only jumped on the wagon when the insurrectionist 
train was already gathering speed and becoming more or less unstoppable, i.e. by 
conservative Islamist
3
 groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists. Both of 
them and the political parties they formed after the revolution are in substance based on 
religious principles and ideologies and this may have worrying consequences which we are 
now beginning to see with the new Egyptian Constitution and the recent events in Tunisia. 
Their candidacy in the Egyptian parliamentary elections was prima facie in violation of 
Article 4 of the Constitutional Declaration (CD) of March 2011
4
 which prohibited the 
participation and even the establishment of religious parties: 
 
Citizens have the right to establish associations, syndicates, federations, and parties according to the 
law. It is forbidden to form associations whose activities are opposed to the order of society or secret or 
of militaristic nature. No political activity shall be exercised, nor political parties established on a 
religious referential authority, on a religious basis or on discrimination on grounds of gender or origin. 
 
The nonchalance with which this fundamental constitutional issue was already then brushed 
aside by the Islamists, and not enforced despite the fact that the military was still in control, 
did not bode well. These concerns have materialized with the new Constitution
5
. Nathan 
Brown believes that there will be no repetition of an Iranian-style theocracy
6
. Yet, given that 
the extremist fringe has historically often succeeded in cowing moderate practices by the 
threat or use of violence against moderates and liberals, this is not necessarily a consolation. 
In some countries, notably Pakistan, the use of doubtful
7
 and harsh interpretations of Shari’ah 
law against non-Muslims and other Muslims in the context of, for example, the blasphemy 
laws and the so-called “takfir wars”, occurs within an ostentatiously democratic setting which 
is, however, beset by radical Islamist propaganda, imams who do not shrink from praising the 
Islamist murderer of a moderate governor as someone who made “every Muslim proud“8, and 
                                                          
3
 This word is used here to denote any adherent to the idea of a political Islam, not just the extremists. 
4
  See www.cabinet.gov.eg/AboutEgypt/ConstitutionalDeclaration_e.pdf. 
5
 See the text at http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated. 
6
 Nathan Brown, Post-Revolutionary Al Azhar, September 2011, available online at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/03/post-revolutionary-al-azhar/5m9t , at 1, 15 and 17.  
7
  See Matthew J Nelson, In the Shadow of Shari’ah – Islam, Islamic Law and Democracy in Pakistan, 2011. 
8
 See http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/murderers-and-martyrs-the-difficult-struggle-of-christians-in-
the-orient-a-738971-2.html.  
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an uneducated as well as impoverished vast majority who lacks the intellectual wherewithal 
to scrutinise and where necessary, resist the messages spread by both
9
.  Brown also made the 
important point that in Egypt the role of Al Azhar may become central to this development 
and that the struggle for control over it as well as its constitutional remit has already begun, 
with the current moderate Grand Imam Al-Tayeb still providing a bulwark against an Islamist 
“Durchmarsch through the institutions“10. The new Constitution bears Brown’s predictions 
out
11
. Al Azhar is the oldest and quite possibly most prestigious seat of Sunni theology and 
learning in the world and even though not legally binding in general, its opinions will have a 
large impact on Sunni Muslim attitudes and policies
12
. Its 2011 declaration on the Arab 
Revolution
13
 is a good example of the latent reform potential of the institution for the 
development of Islamic principles: 
 
The forces of the revolution and reform should unite in achieving their dream of justice and freedom. 
They should also avoid sectarian, ethnic, doctrinal and religious conflicts in order to preserve their 
national fabric and respect citizens' rights; and they should join forces to achieve a democratic 
transformation for the benefit of everyone, in a framework of national consensus and harmony aimed at 
building a future based on equality and justice. Furthermore, they must prevent the uprising to be 
exploited by sectarianism or denominationalism or to provoke religious sensitivities
14
. 
 
The latter exhortation would, however, seem to have gone unheeded. To be sure, there can be 
no argument from the point of view of pure democratic theory that if the electorate wants a 
majority for Islamist parties and the outcome of the elections sanctions that desire, then 
democracy has prima facie worked. Interestingly in this context, as a poll in July 2011 about 
the constitutional referendum in Egypt and in particular Article 2, which establishes Shari’ah 
as the primary source of law, seems to indicate, both Muslim and Christian responses were 
quite similar with regard to the overall referendum and more aligned to socio-economic 
                                                          
9
 See Michael Bohlander, “There is no compulsion in religion” – Freedom of religion, Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) and Crimes against Humanity at the Example of the Islamic Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan, [2012] 8 
Journal of Islamic State Practices in International Law, 36. 
10
 Nathan Brown, ibid. (fn. 6), at 8 ff. 
11
 See Article 4:  “Al-Azhar is an encompassing independent Islamic institution, with exclusive autonomy over 
its own affairs, responsible for preaching Islam, theology and the Arabic language in Egypt and the world. Al-
Azhar Senior Scholars are to be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law.” – online at 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated. 
12
 Ibid (fn. 6), at 4 ff. 
13
 See for the English translation http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ilm/AlAzharDeclaration.pdf.  
14
 See http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ilm/AlAzharDeclaration.pdf, under “Fourth”. 
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standing, but there was a clear split along religious lines with regard to Article 2
15
. An 
entirely different issue is whether Muslims understand democracy in the same sense as 
people in the West would. Evidence from a major 2007 Gallup Survey indicates that while 
some form of democracy is supported by a large part of the population in the surveyed 
Muslim countries, the qualifier that it needs to be in compliance with Shari’ah was also 
emphasised by a large majority
16
. A key issue in any democracy is the role of human rights 
and civil liberties. Here the evidence is not encouraging: The 1990 Cairo Declaration on 
Human Rights in Islam
17
 does not match the secular understanding of human rights, either, 
precisely because of the religious element
18
 involved. Some examples shall suffice (my 
emphases): 
 
From the Preamble 
Reaffirming the civilizing and historical role of the Islamic Ummah which Allah made as the best 
community and which gave humanity a universal and well-balanced civilization, in which harmony is 
established between hereunder and the hereafter, knowledge is combined with faith, and to fulfill the 
expectations from this community to guide all humanity which is confused because of different and 
conflicting beliefs and ideologies and to provide solutions for all chronic problems of this materialistic 
civilization. 
 
Article 22 
(a) Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not be contrary 
to the principles of the Shari'ah. 
(b) Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is right, and propagate what is good, and warn 
against what is wrong and evil according to the norms of Islamic Shari'ah.  
(c) Information is a vital necessity to society. It may not be exploited or misused in such a way as may 
violate sanctities and the dignity of Prophets, undermine moral and ethical Values or disintegrate, 
corrupt or harm society or weaken its faith. 
(d) It is not permitted to excite nationalistic or doctrinal hatred or to do anything that may be an 
incitement to any form of racial discrimination. 
 
 
                                                          
15
 See Jayson Casper, Comparing Muslim and Christian responses in the El-Zanaty Survey, in Cornelis Hulsman 
(ed.) The Sharia as the Main Source of Legislation? – The Egyptian Debate on Article II of the Egyptian 
Constitution, 2012, 115 – 116. 
16
 John L Esposito/Dalia Mogahed, Who speaks for Islam? – What a billion Muslims really think, 2007, 29 ff. – 
How far this survey is still accurate after the events surrounding the Arab revolution is open to question. 
17
 Http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html. 
18
 Similar restrictions based on the precedence of the Shari‘ah are present some provisions on freedom of 
religion in the otherwise somewhat more advanced Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004 – see Mervat 
Rishmawi, The Arab Charter on Human Rights and the League of Arab States: an update [2010] Human Rights 
Law Review, 169 ff.  
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Article 24 
All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'ah. 
 
Article 25 
The Islamic Shari'ah is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification of any of the 
articles of this Declaration.  
 
Obviously, the reliance on one religion
19
 to define human rights does not correspond to the 
idea behind human rights in the first place. Article 22(d) is honoured more in the breach than 
in observance by Islamists and takfiris and enforcement of the prohibition seems to be lax at 
best. The text of the preamble is nothing short of an insult to all non-Muslims, religious or 
not. Notwithstanding the question of what the effect the Cairo Declaration has under law, it 
shows the mindset with which modern transitional efforts in the Muslim context might have 
to contend, especially if the process is being driven by Islamist ideals
20
. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 The new Egyptian Constitution excludes Shi’a Islam from its ambit. See Article 219:  “The principles of 
Islamic Sharia include general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources 
accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community.” – Online at 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated. 
20
 Modern Muslim theoretical apologists of a specifically Islamic human rights discourse take, of course, a 
different stance and employ such concepts as the ECtHR’s “margin of appreciation“ doctrine to allow for 
accommodation of particularly Muslim approaches; see, for example, Mashood A Baderin, International Human 
Rights and Islamic Law, paperback edition 2005, 219 ff at 231 ff. Baderin advocates in effect a bilateral 
accommodation with Islamic law striving to conform to international human rights standards, and the latter in 
effect granting Islamic law some leeway based on “Islamic ethical and moral values“ (at 222). Baderin calls the 
Cairo Declaration “current codified Islamic human rights standards recognized by Muslim states“ (at 48), so it 
would be fair to assume that they represent at least the main substance of those ethical and moral values, as the 
Declaration itself would seem to say in its Preamble. It is of interest to note that of the 39 instances (see page xx 
of the book for a list) where Baderin refers to the Cairo Declaration, only two (at 60 and 217) can be said to 
contain an analysis and/or critique of the Declaration, even where in the remaining 37 there are cases of a lack 
of a corresponding protection under the Declaration compared to international human rights law, which 
reinforces the conclusion that the Declaration is in Baderin’s view in sync with general Islamic doctrine. In any 
event, the basic difference between the secular and the Islamic approach, as Baderin himself points out (at 51), 
is that the former is anthropocentric and the latter theocentric – and that theocentric quality, as the Premable 
shows, is not deistic but Islamic, in other words in a human rights system governed solely by Islamic law the 
God who determines the rights of humans and their ambit is the God as seen and constructed by Islam, not any 
other religion, and certainly not any non-religious ideology. To which extent these rights are human and/or 
rights is thus open to question. Baderin himself appears to advocate what he calls an “inclusive universalism“ 
(at 28 – 29) based on a “multi-cultural or cross-cultural approach“ (at 28) and opines that it “may only be 
difficult, but not impossible“ to arrive at a “universally acceptable consensus“ (at 29). How far adherents of 
political Islam would be prepared to engage in such a mutual trade-off exercise remains to be seen – see the text 
around the following footnotes. 
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Islam(ism) and Transition – A Doubtful Process? 
 
The real problem, at any rate, is what comes after the elections: Will democracy have worked 
once and then be discarded
21
 for a more or less Shari’ah-based state model run by Islamists, 
or will its ideas remain in the fibre of the new country
22
 and also bind the Islamist politicians 
to its principles, such as human rights and the rule of law? The new Constitution does not 
provide any comfort here, with its vague and conflicting messages especially on freedom of 
religion and opinion in Articles 43 – 45 and 21523. Will the fundamentalists and radicals 
succeed in driving the moderates before them, because the latter do not wish to appear as lax 
Muslims, and all will be caught in an ever increasing spiral of proving who the better believer 
is?  Evidence from the Muslim world does not help in dispelling concerns about 
radicalisation as opposed to mere moderate Islamisation:  The spread of blasphemy and 
apostasy laws appears to be on the rise in the Islamic world
24
. In 2012, Kuwait passed a law 
allowing for the imposition of the death penalty on Muslims for insulting Islam, God or 
Mohammed, and a minimum sentence of 10 years for Christians and other non-Muslims
25
.
 
Further evidence of a creeping Islamisation of the Egyptian administration of justice is the 
conviction in 2012 of Egyptian actor Adel Imam for insulting Islam by portraying critical 
characters in film and on stage
26
. Open intolerance vis-à-vis other faiths, for example 
Christians despite their nature as “people of the book”, seems to be alive and well in the Gulf 
region with Saudi Arabia still banning the building of churches
27
, its Grand Mufti demanding 
the destruction of existing ones and Kuwaiti politicians considering similar moves
28
. In 
Malaysia, the sale of some European teams’ Euro 2012 football jerseys imprinted with a 
                                                          
21
 The present Islamist Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan is on record for having recited a poem in 1997 that 
went as follows: “Democracy is merely the train we board, the mosques are our barracks, the minarets our 
spears and the believers our soldiers“.  - My translation from the German quote cited in Necla Kelek, 
Himmelsreise – Mein Streit mit den Wächtern des Islam, paperback ed., 2011, 95.  
22
 Some scholars have denied that Egypt, for example, is in a proper state of transition at all. See Reem Abou-el-
Fadl, Beyond Conventional Transitional Justice: Egypt’S 2011 Revolution and the Absence of Political Will, 
(2012) International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1.  
23
 See http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated. 
24
 Paul Marshall/Nina Shea, Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes are Choking Freedom Worldwide, 
2011. 
25
 See http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2012/12/kuwait-introduces-death-penalty-for-cursing-god-and-
prophets. The Emir had previously blocked the effect of the vote in June 2012, see 
http://www.catholic.org/international/international_story.php?id=48968. He was overruled by a 2/3 Islamist 
majority in Parliament, yet the law did not enter into force because the Parliament was dissolved by the Emir 
and the Constitutional Court immediately afterwards (Communication from Dhari Al-Fadhalah, Kuwait, of 21 
March 2013 – on file with the author). 
26
 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17832703. – See generally on the rise of blasphemy 
prosecutions in the Islamic world http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/Blasphemy_Cases.pdf. 
27
 See http://www.secularism.org.uk/saudikingwantsmonotheismstounite.html. 
28
 See http://rt.com/news/peninsula-saudi-grand-mufti-701/. 
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cross was banned by Muslim clerics who argued that wearing them would be “promoting the 
devil”29.  In Libya, the re-introduction of Shari’ah is openly demanded30 and Salafi radicals 
have begun destroying the tombs of saints revered by some Muslims
31
.  In Nigeria, the Boko 
Haram Islamist group has carried out a series of attacks on Christian churches and killed 
hundreds of people, including moderate Muslims
32
.  In Indonesia, Islamist violence against 
minorities such as Christians and Ahmadis is on the rise, with the state turning a blind eye
33
. 
Even Tunisia, a country which had been considered as a success story in terms of a moderate 
Islamist government, is facing violent Islamist unrest as the controversy over modern art 
exhibitions
34
 and the recent assassination of a prominent opposition leader
35
 have shown, and 
there is doubt about how far the ruling Ennahda party is willing to tackle the more extreme 
elements in the country
36
. The Egyptian tourism industry is worried about conflicting 
messages from the Islamist factions about the availability of alcohol for non-Muslim tourists 
and the regulation of appropriate beach wear
37
. The perennial issue of women’s rights in 
Islam merits special mention in this context: It seems that as soon as Islamist politicians
38
 
gain power the first thing they have to do is to roll back
39
 any positive development of the 
status of women that may have been achieved until then – as if there were not more important 
issues to deal with in the entire Muslim world than enforcing the veil and ensuring 
                                                          
29
 See http://midnightwatcher.wordpress.com/2012/06/06/malaysian-clerics-ban-sale-of-soccer-jerseys-
containing-dangerous-cross-symbol-you-are-only-promoting-the-devil/. 
30
 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8844819/Libyas-liberation-
interim-ruler-unveils-more-radical-than-expected-plans-for-Islamic-law.html. 
31
 See the response from the Libyan ulama at http://shanfaraa.com/2012/08/statement-from-libyan-ulama-on-
the-salafi-destruction-of-mosques-and-tombs/. 
32
 See http://www.usip.org/publications/what-boko-haram. 
33
 See http://en.qantara.de/Democracy-without-Tolerance/19359c20500i1p497/index.html. 
34
 See http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2012/06/12/tunisian-islamists-riot-over-art-show-they-say-insults-
muslims/. 
35
 See http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/opinion/the-assassination-of-chokri-belaid-in-tunisia.html?_r=0. 
36
 See http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/salafists-in-tunisia-riot-over-art-heresy.  
37
 See the telling comment at http://www.ummah.com/forum/showthread.php?313848-Egypt-Muslim-
Brotherhood-reassures-tourists-Alcohol-and-women-will-be-there. 
38
 This does not just apply to the usual suspects. i.e. the Salafis in the Middle East and Pakistan: Even respected 
and courted European Muslim intellectuals such as Tariq Ramadan find it difficult to come clean and renounce 
religion- and tradition-based gender discrimination outright, because he wants to start from within the existing 
texts of the Qur’an and the Sunna as well as Islamic tradition; see the chapter on the issue in his Radical Reform 
– Islamic Ethics and Liberation, 2009, 207 ff. and particularly at 208: “Clearly, the internal debate in the light of 
scriptural sources must be thought through and started from within, and it cannot simply and naturally identify 
with, or be assimilated with categories introduced by women and feminists in Western societies“. If this 
sentence is to have any meaningful substance, it implies by necessity that what women want in the West, i.e. 
simply full equality in law with men and the right to make their own life choices, is either not something that 
Muslim women want (which appears doubtful), or not something that an Islamic debate “from within“ can 
subscribe to unreservedly. If the latter is true, then the title of Ramadan‘s book is a multiple contradiction in 
terms. 
39
 See in the context of the Arab Spring http://en.qantara.de/Women-as-Losers-of-the-
Revolution/19346c20482i1p500/index.html. 
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patriarchal
40
 customs of disposing of women in the family as one would of chattels
41
. It 
remains to be seen to what extent the involvement or not of women in the transitional process 
will have – or would have had – a beneficial effect. It is in any event a terrible waste of 
human potential
42
 not to refer to the insight of the female half
43
 of any population, especially 
in such historical periods of a nation’s life, and a sign of serious deficiency in democratic 
terms. As Shereen El Feki puts it: “It’s hard to see how democracy can flourish in a society if 
its constitutional and cultural cornerstone in the family is so undemocratic”44. 
 
We all know from reliable media reports that the examples mentioned above are not out of 
character and have been on the agenda for quite a while. It appears that there is an elephant in 
the room that everyone who is a moderate participant to the cross-cultural dialogue is doing 
their best to ignore or to explain away: If it seems, and the evidence so far is more in favour 
of that contention than against it, that political Islam – at the very least as practised – is part 
of the problem and not of the solution, then how can it be a supporting factor in a transition 
towards good governance under the rule of law? Political Islam is overwhelmingly 
conservative Islam, and not rarely ultra-conservative or even violent-extremist.  It is difficult 
to reconcile the evidence with the claim by the more moderate Muslim clerics and 
intellectuals that extremism is un-Islamic, and ultimately this poses the question from whose 
point of view the “extreme” is defined and where zealous devotion crosses the line into blind 
fanaticism. It is not sufficient to reiterate like a mantra that Islam is a religion of peace and 
                                                          
40
 It is almost as if Naguib Mahfouz, the Egyptian Nobel Prize laureate, had never written his Cairo Trilogy 
(1956 – 57), in which he dissects a Cairene Muslim family‘s life as well as the socio-political life in Cairo in the 
period from 1919 until 1944, and especially castigates the duplicitous behaviour of the main character, the self-
important family tyrant, father and husband Ahmad Abd al-Jawad, who imposes the strict traditional rules of 
conduct on the female members of his household, but has himself an excessive and loose life style, involving 
women and alcohol. 
41
 On the situation in Germany see Necla Kelek, Himmelsreise – Mein Streit mit den Wächtern des Islam, 
paperback ed., 2011; and more generally the collection of essays in Dutch by the Somali Ayaan Hirsi Ali, De 
Maagdenkooi, 2004. 
42
 Yet, even in Saudi Arabia exceptions are possible if there is the necessary political will: At the King Abdullah 
University of Science and Technology (KAUST) women are allowed to drive on campus, do not have to wear a 
veil and can attend mixed classes with male students, something which would boggle the mind of any Saudi in a 
normal setting, and this has drawn the criticism of the Saudi ulama who want to have the courses vetted 
according to Islamic law. This has led King Abdullah to dismiss a member of the highest clerical authority, 
Sheikh Saad al-Shithri, who had publicly criticised the policy.  – See “KAUST resets top 10 ambitions“, online 
at http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?sectioncode=26&storycode=420231.  
43
 Here again, it may be apposite to refer to the 2007 Gallup Report on the views of women, where the defining 
element of the questioning process was the juxtaposition to Western forms of equality, and apparently Muslim 
women did not admire the Western view because in their eyes women were sexually degraded at the same time 
as being liberated to equality under law; the conceptual disjunction of the two issues did not seem to register 
with the respondents. Another reason given was that full equality would mean women would have to contribute 
to their own and the family income, something which traditional Islamic law does not require them to do at all; 
ibid (fn. 16), 99 ff. 
44
 Sex and the Citadel – Intimate Life in a Changing Arab World, 2013, 91. 
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tolerance and to refer to its undoubtedly high-minded ideals in the maqasid al-Shari’ah45, if 
some highly visible adherents of that religion and/or a largely tradition-oriented majority do 
not practise them. Islam has always, and rightly so, denied that kind of excuse to Christians 
or other religions if they did not live up to the demands of their faiths or principles. It must 
suffer to be held to the same standards. To refer to the allegedly flawless nature of Shari’ah 
and other Islamic precepts in the face of their violation by literalist fundamentalists in 
practice is reminiscent of someone who tells you not to worry about people committing 
crimes because there is a perfect criminal law. The practical occurrence of retrograde 
development
46
 apparent in several recent Muslim-led transitional or (post-)conflict situations 
such as Afghanistan (during and after the Taliban
47
 regime), early and modern-day Pakistan, 
Iraq, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya would also appear to give that theoretical 
discourse about the perfection of Shari’ah the lie, and particularly so when it comes to other 
religions, even the ahl al-kitab.  
 
How far is Islam as practised in the region (and also in the West) capable and/or willing to 
recognise the legitimacy of other faiths or ideologies without asking the question about the 
“true religion”? How far are the main actors in the Muslim (factual) hierarchy – political and 
religious – willing to teach the uneducated and analphabetic masses tolerance and 
                                                          
45
 E.g. Baderin, ibid (fn 20) at 15, 41 – 44, 88, 222, 224. - A typical recent example of overlooking the reality 
and extolling the theoretical virtues of Islamic rules can be found in Maher Y. Abu-Munshar, In the shadow of 
the ‘Arab Spring’: the fate of non-Muslims under Islamist rule, [2012] 23 Islam and Christian-Muslim 
Relations, 487. 
46
 Islam has a massive international image problem based on how it is visibly practised as opposed to 
intellectual issues in usul al-fiqh. The problem is only at the surface the terrorist violence. The real problem is 
the inflexibility of those Muslims who insist on the right to live their faith in full according to their traditions, 
even if these clash with the values of the host society or international standards. The inflexibility is justified by 
divine command and thus placed beyond the reach of merely human argument. This approach is in contradiction 
to the principles of an open secular society which, and that is the rub, was built on the experience of centuries of 
oppression based on religion, for example in Europe, this time by corporate Christianity. An open secular 
society works on the principle that no-one gets to live out his own ideas in full as soon as that clashes with the 
spheres of others, and it mostly will clash somewhere. An Islam which is not prepared to compromise because 
of its own perceived superiority does not fit into an open society, but destroys it from within by using the 
openness for its own ends. The main worry of those people who subscribe to the idea of an open society is thus 
not really the spectre of Islamic overpopulation as a demographic threat based on Muslim birth rates. It is the 
erosion of their own freedom through the (ab-)use of the very liberties provided by that same open society, by 
persons who do not want to sacrifice anything of their own sphere so as to contribute something to rather than 
demand more from society. Every position secured by Muslim human rights litigation also means a restriction 
on what the open society and its members can do with regard to Muslims. The record of Muslim abidance by 
decisions which do not go in their favour is far from perfect; at this stage the superior divine command is often 
mobilised and in some cases the state is more or less openly challenged into enforcement. To lay the blame for 
this concern only at the feet of the people who are worried about the developments and to accuse them simply of 
uninformed Islamophobia is disingenuous and at worst obfuscatory propaganda. 
47
 It is often overlooked that the Taliban themselves were a transitional Muslim regime after the previous 
government and the Mujahidin had been ousted. 
11 
 
recognition, and to publicly educate and reprimand the highly visible extremists about their 
un-Islamic interpretation of Islam and the Shari’ah? How great is the chance of disentangling 
religious teaching and ethnic traditions, such as honour killings and forcing women to wear 
the veil and be subservient to males? The evidence for a change to the positive so far is less 
than encouraging
48
, even – and maybe especially – with those Muslims living in Europe and 
the US, where they often strive more towards the creation of parallel spheres
49
 of society and 
even law, than towards integration with – as opposed to assimilation 50  to – the host 
community
51
.  
                                                          
48
 The Muslim Brotherhood, according to one of its functionaries, Midhat Saki, still has the ultimate aim of 
establishing the global Islamic Caliphate, although, as he said, without the use of force; see Alexander 
Smoltczyk, Unter Brüdern, Der Spiegel 21/2012, 94 – 96.  – Similarly, one of the Salafists behind the mass 
Qur’an distribution campaign in Germany in May and June 2012 – see 
http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,16035993,00.html and http://en.qantara.de/Mass-Conversions-in-Public-
Places/19344c20480i1p500/index.html – Ibrahim Abu Nagie, declared in an interview that he wants Shari’ah to 
rule on a global level as a natural consequence of his Islamic faith, see 
http://www.swr.de/blog/terrorismus/2012/05/24/interview-mit-ibrahim-abou-nagie/. Asked by the interviewer 
whether he respected democracy, he replied (my translation): “This is not about respect. The people here must 
understand this. Someone, a Muslim who denies the Shari’ah, he immediately leaves Islam. He is an infidel. 
How can I as a Muslim accept any other system but that of Allah. I say [cites the shahadah in Arabic] 
presupposes that Allah is the ruler, and guides us. But we live in this country and have no problems with that. 
But things which go against the Shari’ah we reject, and Shari’ah comes from the bottom, not the top. ... That 
means that the Muslims themselves have to want the Shari’ah first, and the leader is merely a symbol.“ 
49
 Compare the furore caused in Germany in 2010 by the public outcry over Thilo Sarrazin’s book Deutschland 
schafft sich ab – Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen, 2010, and the response by a number of intellectuals in 
Deutschlandstiftung Integration (ed.) Sarrazin – Eine deutsche Debatte, 2010. 
50
 Turkish President Erdogan during a recent visit to Germany told a football stadium full of Turkish expats 
verbatim that assimilation was a “crime against humanity“; see the full text of the speech at 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/2.220/erdogan-rede-in-koeln-im-wortlaut-assimilation-ist-ein-verbrechen-
gegen-die-menschlichkeit-1.293718. 
51
 See for the German example Joachim Wagner, Richter ohne Gesetz – Islamische Paralleljustiz gefährdet 
unseren Rechtsstaat, 2011; Karl Albrecht Schachtschneider, Grenzen der Religionsfreiheit am Beispiel des 
Islam, 2nd ed., 2011; for a view on the European situation see Christopher Caldwell, Reflections on the 
Revolution in Europe – Can Europe be the same with different people in it?, 2009. – His book and similar others 
have been severely criticised as adding to a culture of Islamophobic fearmongering based on demographic 
concerns of Muslim overpopulation and/or lack of knowledge about Islam by, for example, Pankaj Mishra in 
The Guardian, see http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2009/aug/15/eurabia-islamophobia-europe-colonised-
muslims. This criticism overlooks the fact that creating and sustaining fear of possible retaliation is an 
undeniable part of the arsenal of Islamist propaganda itself, and we have by now arrived at a stage where there is 
no more need for explicit threats, and that those who do not expressly make them can actually brand themselves 
as moderates. Moderate Muslims in the proper sense of the word, who may merely react in a seriously offended 
manner, as a devout traditional Christian might, do thus not have to threaten or even contemplate reprisals 
themselves because the audience will by default assume that such a reaction may be in the realm of the possible, 
based on narratives about other Muslims who have, sometimes wholly unexpectedly, reverted to violence. In 
such a situation it is psychologically hardly helpful to the debate to distinguish between religious and traditional 
or ethnic sources of behaviour and to blame the violent part wholly on the latter. In any event, there is some 
evidence that at least as far as folk-Islam as opposed to scholarly Islam is concerned, the two have merged in the 
Muslim consciousness, with the consequence that  less well-educated Muslims will themselves be unable to 
make that distinction anymore – compare Sami Zubaida, Beyond Islam – A New Understanding of the Middle 
East, 2011, 111. Similar phenomena can be noticed in most if not all scripture-based religions after they have 
had sufficient time to build up settled rituals and practices which often mix with pre-existing folklore. It is then 
these rituals and practices which transport religious identity to a possibly larger degree than the finer points of 
the doctrinal teachings with which many believers will be unfamiliar to begin with.   
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Islamic self-understanding, religious psychology and Arab reason as obstacles to 
progress? 
 
This leads us to asking a very blunt question: Does the reliance on internal Islamic frames of 
reference as well as the heavy emphasis of and in parts almost slavish adherence
52
 to 
centuries-old sources from different and more often than not overcome and outdated Arab 
historical and societal contexts allow Muslims to consider such reforms, or is it not necessary 
for them to step outside the box and the historical straitjacket of Islamic sources and to try to 
view their own system through the eyes of the others, i.e. non-Muslims? To hope for such a 
move may seem illusory given the vehement resistance traditionalists put up against any form 
of innovation
53
. One should not fall into the trap of thinking that what a few thousand 
students, intellectuals and other well-meaning reform-minded people may say will have any 
direct impact on the situation on the ground: Hope for a short- or even midterm change is 
likely to be wishful thinking unless the Islamic and the Arab world in particular tackles the 
prejudices and preconceptions imminent in its education systems, the traditional family and 
wider ethnic structures, and empowers the masses of its ordinary citizens to think and decide 
for themselves as individuals, instead of abiding by a tradition- and community-based 
identity-encoding model; this goes for both men and women. To protest against oppressive 
governments, high unemployment and corruption is not the same as engaging in a sustained 
effort to reconcile Islamic thinking with the realities of the 21st century
54
.  Is the Islamic 
world forever going to be trapped in its traditional religiosity, or “lost in the sacred”, as Dan 
Diner
55
 put it? In other words, is it right to say that Muslims simply cannot be trusted ever to 
wish to join modern democratic society and, more to the point, to separate state and religion, 
and is that separation considered necessary at all by Islamic bodies politic? Is the transitional 
effort in the wake of the Arab Spring destined to fail and fall prey to people with literally 
medieval minds and sectarian agendas? Before we look at Lessing’s play, we need to 
understand that with Islam’s traditional refusal56 to separate religion and state, transitional 
justice is not merely about institution-building and legal or political awareness training – it is 
                                                          
52
 See Abdullahi Ahmed An Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, 1996, 161 ff.. 
53
 Compare the accounts by Sadakat Kadri, Heaven on Earth – A Journey through Shari’ah Law, 2011, 163 ff. 
and John L Esposito, The Future of Islam, 2010, 88 ff.
  
54
 See, for example, http://en.qantara.de/The-Arab-Uprising-Was-Not-about-Liberal-
Democracy/18498c19256i1p/index.html. 
55
 Dan Diner, Lost in the Sacred, 2007. 
56
 See for a modern Islamic approach to this conundrum Abdullahi Ahmed An Na’im, Islam and the Secular 
State – Negotiating the Future of Shari’a, 2008. 
13 
 
also and to a large part about religious psychology and parental as well as peer-group based 
behavioural conditioning. Other fundamental questions must be asked in this context: Are 
Muslims willing to accept that it must be permissible to question the tenets of their faith, and 
to subject even its primary sources to historical-critical research which does not proceed from 
the premise that they are sacrosanct in their textual integrity and that any instances of 
vagueness or inconsistency merely await the right interpreter? Are they prepared to subject 
them to an external criticism to which the Christian holy scriptures, for example, have been 
subjected for many decades
57
? Are they prepared to accept that non-Muslims do not have to 
proceed from a pro-Islamic position in the cross-cultural conversation and do not have to 
spare the religious feelings of Muslims in what they say? Are they willing to engage in such 
research themselves to avoid any grounds for the often vociferous and emotionally charged 
denial of the findings of Western Orientalist research
58
? Or will they remain in an attitude of 
religious superiority by insisting that they alone are in possession of the final revelation, sent 
down verbatim to Mohammed from Heaven, and that Mohammed was an infallible 
interpreter of God’s will? Will they fear that Islam as a religion will fall with the divine 
nature of the Qur’an and/or an uncoupling of political from private religious life? These are 
hard and very uncomfortable questions but as long as Muslims will not accept the need to 
consider such a drastic concept, so long will they by definition be talking down to others
59
.  
 
Especially as far as the Islamic tradition has been influenced by Arab thinking, it is 
interesting to hear what the Moroccan philosopher Mohamed Abed al-Jabri has expressed in 
his “Critique of Arab Reason”60: 
 
“The entire modern and contemporary Arab thinking is characterised by the lack of historical 
perspective and objectivity. The only reading offered of tradition is a fundamentalist one, which 
                                                          
57
 This has so far apparently not been the case – see Angelika Neuwirth, Der Koran als Text der Spätantike – 
Ein europäischer Zugang, 2010, 767 – 768. 
58
 For an example of the ad personam style of argument, see Mustafa as-Siba’ee, The Sunnah and its Role in 
Islamic Legislation, 2008, when he takes on the noted orientalist Ignaz Goldziher, at 254: “Perhaps the most 
dangerous of the Orientalists as well as the most despicable in this regard is the Jewish Orientalist Ignaz 
Goldziher”; and at 264: “An important lesson for Goldziher is that a liar must at the very least make his lies 
seem plausible.” 
59
 In this context it is hardly surprising that a running theme of any Islamist propaganda video is the copious use 
of the index finger raised in schoolmasterly if not warning or even threatening admonition by the speaker. 
60
 Mohamed Abed al-Jabri, Kritik der arabischen Vernunft – Die Einführung, 2009. The translation of the 
following excerpts is by the author from the German version of al-Jabri’s book “Naqd al-aql al-arabi“, which in 
turn was translated from the French, so hopefully there are not too many undiscovered and misunderstood 
Chinese whispers here. – For a more extensive discussion of the complexities surrounding the approach to Arab 
Reason see the volume by al-Jabri, The Formation of Arab Reason – Text, Tradition and the Construction of 
Modernity in the Arab World, 2011. 
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transcends the past, sacralises it and tries to extract from it ready-made solutions for the problems of 
the present and the future. This applies without restriction to the Islamist movement, but equally to the 
other streams of thought, of which everyone invokes founding fathers with whom “salvation” is to be 
found. All streams of Arab thinking take their project of a Renaissance from a model oriented towards 
the past …. In the face of each new problem this kind of thinking falls back on the mechanical thought 
process of finding ready-made solutions in relationship to some “foundation”. … The Arab reason can 
be renewed only by questioning the old and through a thorough critique…”61 
 
Al-Jabri highlights, perhaps with some philosophical license, the deleterious influence which 
tradition-guided thinking
62
 has had on the Arab mind: 
 
“.. [T]he contemporary Arab reader is restricted by his tradition and crushed by his present, which 
means firstly that tradition absorbs him, robs him of independence and freedom. Since he entered the 
world he has been inculcated with tradition, in the form of a certain vocabulary and a certain attitude, 
language and way of thinking; in the form of fables, legends and imaginary ideas, a certain manner of 
relating to things and a manner of thought; in the form of knowledge and truths. He receives all this 
without any critical analysis and without an iota of critical intellect. Through these inculcated elements 
he perceives things; on them he bases his opinions and observations. The exercise of thinking under 
these conditions resembles more a memory game. When the Arab reader delves into the traditional 
texts, then his manner of reading is that of remembering, in no way, however, is it exploring or 
reflecting.”63 
 
This analysis may not be entirely on point for the foreign-educated intellectual urban elite, 
but it is certainly in resonance with the appearance of the thought processes manifested by 
many if not most of the traditionally trained ulama, and, of course, the less well-educated 
majority of the population who will likely accept anything their imams tell them almost 
unquestioningly.  
 
Ambiguous Islamic attitudes especially towards Christianity 
 
The two verses from the Qur’an cited at the beginning of this paper are evidence of a 
conflicted stance of Islam even towards one of its Abrahamitic sister religions. The reference 
                                                          
61
 Ibid, 80 – 81. 
62
 See for its impact on the Arab education system http://en.qantara.de/No-Arab-Spring-in-
Education/19337c20473i0p162/index.html. 
63
 Ibid. (fn. 60) 86 – 87 (emphasis in the original). – See also similarly Necla Kelek, Ein Befreiungsschlag, in 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 August 2010, on the Sarrazin Debate about education patterns among 
Muslims in Germany. 
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made to Sura 5:48 in the interfaith debate overlooks another one only three verses down, 
namely 5:51. For Salafists, reference to the tafsir of Ibn Kathir as one of the standard 
traditional commentaries on the Qur’an will be a tempting option, and we find the following 
commentary on 5:51: 
 
“Allah forbids His believing servants from having Jews and Christians as friends64, because they are 
the enemies of Islam and its people, may Allah curse them. Allah then states that they are friends of 
each other and He gives a warning threat to those who do this.”65 
 
Nothing is said about this verse ever having been abrogated by later verses. In the celebrated 
Common Word of 2007
66
, an open letter from the Muslim side about a fresh start in Muslim-
Christian relations, which was signed by 138 Muslim religious authorities, 5:51 is not 
mentioned at all. While the Common Word is based on the two linked commandments of 
loving God and one’s neighbour, its authors apparently could not (at page 15 of the English 
version) resist inserting a jibe about the Trinity and the previous debate among early 
Christians about the divine nature of Christ
67
: 
 
“Muslims recognize Jesus Christ as the Messiah, not in the same way Christians do (but Christians 
themselves anyway have never all agreed with each other on Jesus Christ’s nature)” 
 
On page 14, the Common Word qualifies the neighbourly love of Muslims for Christians in 
the following manner: 
 
“As Muslims, we say to Christians that we are not against them and that Islam is not against them—so 
long as they do not wage war against Muslims on account of their religion, oppress them and drive 
them out of their homes…” 
 
While it may have been well-intentioned and sincere, the impression which the Common 
Word leaves is that the Muslim side was after all unable to change its spots. It is difficult to 
                                                          
64
 Some readings also allow for “as protectors“, the Arabic original is awliya’a; see Hartmut Bobzin, Der Koran, 
2010, 646. 
65
 Tafsir Ibn Kathir, Abridged Version, 2000, vol. 5, 204 – my emphasis. - – See also the recent attempt to 
defuse the tension by Hakan Çoruh, Friendship between Muslims and the People of the Book in the Qur’an with 
special reference to Q 5:51, [2012] 23 Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 505. 
66
 See http://acommonword.com/index.php?lang=en&page=option1. 
67
 For an overview of the main classic Christian heresies compare Alister McGrath, Heresy, 2009, 101 ff. 
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imagine how a substantive conversation
68
 among equals can take place against such a 
background
69
.  Verses and commentaries like those above give Islamists a textual basis from 
which to justify an uncompromising attitude in the transitional context. Obviously, a post-
conflict transition process is not only about interfaith relationships but about rebuilding a 
broken state and cleaning up the political debris left behind by an authoritarian and corrupt 
regime. Yet, against the background of recurring instances of religious sectarian violence and 
persecution of, for example, Christians once a non-religious authoritarian ruler in the Arab 
region is removed – examples: Iraq, Egypt and probably soon Syria – the question must be 
allowed whether an Islamist understanding, i.e. whether political Islam can be expected to 
form a solid basis for a transition based on the rule of law and human rights, among them 
freedom of speech and religion. It is here that a look at Lessing’s play and its history as the 
background setting for the Ring Parable will be helpful as a contrasting point of view.  
 
Lessing’s Nathan the Wise as a contrast to traditional Islamic thinking 
 
Lessing wrote the play as a counterpoint against the prevailing Islamophobia in the Christian 
society of his day, and it is of vital importance again after 9/11 and 7/7. The play is decidedly 
pro-Islamic
70
. The setting is in Jerusalem during its occupation by Saladin after the 3
rd
 
Crusade. The central character is the wealthy Jewish merchant Nathan, whose entire family 
was killed in a pogrom carried out by the Templars. Shortly after their death he is entrusted 
by a Christian monk with a little Christian baby girl whose father had recently died in battle. 
He raises her under the Jewish name of Recha as a Jew. When Nathan returns from a long 
voyage, he finds that there had been a fire in his house and that Recha was saved by a young 
Knight Templar, the only one of twenty whom Saladin had let live because he reminded him 
of his brother, and they have fallen in love. Meanwhile, Saladin is in financial straits, because 
his campaign has emptied his coffers. He hears about wealthy Nathan and commands his 
                                                          
68
 Indeed, the previous Grand Imam of Al Azhar, al-Tantawi, during a visit to the Herzog-August-Bibliothek 
Wolfenbüttel  in 1997 in the context of a Lessing event, reportedly said that doctrinal matters should be kept 
apart from the interfaith dialogue. See Wolfenbütteler Bibliotheks-Informationen [1997] vol. 22, No. 1-2. 
Regrettably, there exists no verbatim record or manuscript of the Grand Imam’s address – email of Christian 
Hogrefe, Herzog-August-Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel, of 7 June 2012 (on file with the author). A request to Al 
Azhar for help in this context remained unanswered. 
69
 In an email correspondence with the author of 18 June 2012 (on file with the author), Karl-Josef Kuschel 
expressed the opinion that while he disagreed about the overall evaluation of the Common Word which he  
viewed as a well-intentioned, positive and courageous attempt, he felt that the initiators were not doing enough 
to ensure its dissemination within the Muslim context. It may thus have been, in his view, more of a PR exercise 
for the West than an attempt at substantive reflection. 
70
 For an exposé of Lessing‘s research about Islam and Arabs see George Pons, L‘intérȇt de Lessing pour le 
monde islamique, (1982) 10 Tijdschrift voor de studie van de verlichting, 41 ff.  
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presence in the Palace to find out whether he could obtain money from him. The conversation 
soon strays to Saladin asking him which is the true religion, and Nathan responds with the 
Parable of the Three Rings. The parable merits being reproduced here verbatim: 
 
NATHAN: In days of yore, there dwelt in eastern lands a man who had a ring of priceless worth 
received from hands beloved. The stone it held, an opal, shed a hundred colors fair, and had the magic 
power that he who wore it, trusting its strength, was loved of God and men. No wonder therefore that 
this eastern man would never cease to wear it; and took pains to keep it in his household for all time. 
He left the ring to that one of his sons he loved the best; providing that in turn that son bequeath to his 
most favorite son the ring; and thus, regardless of his birth, the dearest son, by virtue of the ring, should 
be the head, the prince of all his house. You follow, Sultan.  
SALADIN: Perfectly. Continue!  
NATHAN: At last this ring, passed on from son to son, descended to a father of three sons; all three of 
whom were duly dutiful, all three of whom in consequence he needs must love alike.  But yet from 
time to time, now this, now that one, now the third - as each might be with him alone, the other two not 
sharing then his overflowing heart seemed worthiest of the ring; and so to each he promised it, in pious 
frailty. This lasted while it might. - Then came the time for dying, and the loving father finds himself 
embarrassed. It's a grief to him to wound two of his sons, who have relied upon his word. What's to be 
done? He sends in secret to a jeweler, of whom he orders two more rings, in pattern like his own, and 
bids him spare nor cost nor toil to make them in all points identical. The jeweler succeeds. And when 
he brings the rings to him, the sire himself cannot distinguish them from the original. In glee and joy he 
calls his sons to him, each by himself confers on him his blessing.  His ring as well - and dies. - You 
hear me, Sultan?  
SALADIN (who, taken aback, has turned away): I hear, I hear you! - Finish now your fable without 
delay.  I'm waiting!  
NATHAN: I am done. For what ensues is wholly obvious. Scarce is the father dead when all three sons 
appear, each with his ring, and each would be the reigning prince. They seek the facts, they quarrel, 
accuse. In vain; the genuine ring was not demonstrable; (He pauses for a reply.) almost as little as 
today the genuine faith.  
SALADIN: You mean this as the answer to my question?   
NATHAN: What I mean is merely an excuse, if I decline precisely to distinguish those three rings 
which with intent the father ordered made that sharpest eyes might not distinguish them.  
SALADIN: The rings! - Don't trifle with me! - I should think that those religions which I named to you 
Might be distinguished readily enough. Down to their clothing; down to food and drink! 
NATHAN: In all respects except their basic grounds. Are they not grounded all in history or writ or 
handed down? - But history must be accepted wholly upon faith - Not so? -Well then, whose faith are 
we least like to doubt? Our people's, surely? Those whose blood we share? The ones who from our 
childhood gave us proofs of love? Who never duped us, but when it was for our good to be deceived? 
How can I trust my fathers less than you trust yours? (…) - Can I demand that to your forebears you 
should give the lie that mine be not gainsaid? (...) The same holds true of Christians. Am I right? 
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SALADIN (aside): By Allah, yes! The man is right. I must be still.  
NATHAN: Let's come back to our rings once more. As we have said: the sons preferred complaint; and 
each swore to the judge, he had received the ring directly from his father's hand. As was the truth! – 
And long before had had his father's promise, one day to enjoy the privilege of the ring. - No less than 
truth! His father, each asserted, could not have been false to him; of such a loving father: He must 
accuse his brothers - howsoever inclined in other things to think the best of them - of some false play; 
and he the traitors would promptly ferret out; would take revenge.  
SALADIN: And then, the judge? - I am all ears to hear what you will have the judge decide. Speak on!  
NATHAN: Thus said the judge: unless you swiftly bring your father here to me, I’ll bid you leave my 
judgment seat. Think you that I am here for solving riddles? Would you wait, perhaps, until the 
genuine ring should rise and speak? But stop! I hear the genuine ring enjoys the magic power to make 
its wearer loved, beloved of God and men. That must decide! Whom then do two of you love most? 
Quick, speak! You're mute? The rings' effect is only backward, not outward? Each one loves himself 
the most?  O then you are, all three, deceived deceivers! Your rings are false, all three. The genuine 
ring no doubt got lost. To hide the grievous loss, to make it good, the father caused three rings to serve 
for one.  
SALADIN: O splendid, splendid!  
NATHAN: So, the judge went on, if you'll not have my counsel, instead of verdict, go!  My counsel is: 
Accept the matter wholly as it stands. If each one from his father has his ring, then let each one believe 
his ring to be the true one. - Possibly the father wished to tolerate no longer in his house the tyranny of 
just one ring! – And know: That you, all three, he loved; and loved alike; since two of you he'd not 
humiliate to favor one. - Well then! Let each aspire to emulate his father's unbeguiled, unprejudiced 
affection! Let each strive to match the rest in bringing to the fore the magic of the opal in his ring! 
Assist that power with all humility, with benefaction, hearty peacefulness, and with profound 
submission to God's will!  And when the magic powers of the stones reveal themselves in children's 
children's children: I bid you, in a thousand thousand years, to stand again before this seat.  For then a 
wiser man than I will sit as judge upon this bench, and speak.  Depart! - So said the modest judge. 
SALADIN: God! God!  
NATHAN: Now, Saladin, if you would claim to be that wiser man, the promised one...  
SALADIN (rushing to him and seizing his hand, which he retains):  I, dust? I, nothing? God!  
NATHAN: What is the matter, Saladin?  
SALADIN: Dear Nathan! The thousand thousand years your judge assigned are not yet up. - His 
judgment seat is not for me.  Go! Go! But be my friend.
71
  
 
It finally transpires that Recha and the knight are actually brother and sister, and that their 
father was indeed Assad (Arabic for “lion”), Saladin’s younger brother who had been lost for 
a long time when he did not return from a trip, who had married a Christian noble woman and 
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  Based on Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Nathan the Wise, as translated by Bayard Quincy Morgan. In: Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing: Nathan the Wise, Minna von Barnhelm, and Other Plays and Writings. Edited by Peter 
Demetz. New York 1998. S. 231 – 235. 
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had lived under the name of Wolf von Filnek. The knight’s proper name is Leu (old poetic 
German for “lion”), that of Recha is Blanda (Latin for “mild, sweet, amiable”). Thus a 
Christian knight who is the son of a Muslim like his sister, a girl baptised as a Christian and 
raised as a Jew, and a Muslim ruler are all members of one family.  
 
The symbolism could not be stronger against the background of the rationale of the Ring 
Parable: All three faiths are members of one family. Indeed, this seems to have been the 
primary intention of Lessing in writing his Nathan. As Kuschel argues, Lessing wanted to 
impress upon his contemporary Christian audience that it was God’s will that all three 
religions be accepted and regarded by each other as equals, not merely tolerated by 
whichever was the dominant religion in a certain geographical area or at a certain time
72
. The 
way for Lessing to achieve this result is twofold: He firstly posits that the true religion cannot 
be determined because all three of them are based on faith: not only faith in God, but also 
faith in the people in whose traditions we are raised. Secondly, flowing from the first and in a 
heretofore historically unusual twist, Lessing concludes that we have no reason to treat a 
person of another faith as in any way inferior, but quite to the contrary that the love of God 
should exhort the adherents of each religion to strive for good deeds and compassion towards 
and acceptance of other faiths. In order to fulfil this demand of God’s love we must step 
outside of our own religious frame of reference and allow for the possibility that either the 
others are right or that we are all right (or all wrong), and that God may accept adherents of 
all faiths as long as they honestly follow their own.  In other words, the heuristic process 
cannot proceed only from within one’s own religion. One must learn to live with the tension 
of living one’s own faith as if it were the right one and allowing at the same time for the 
possibility that it is either wrong or not the only right one. The depth of one’s personal 
conviction is not a gauge of the degree of the trueness of one’s religion.  In consequence, it 
means we cannot impose our religion on others – or as the Qur’an says, “There is no 
compulsion in religion”73. Only in this way will the “true” religion finally show itself – and it 
seems fair to assume that Lessing had no illusions about only one of them ever reaching that 
stage short of another direct divine intervention. This is where Nathan and the Qur’an meet in 
Sura 5:48, and where they clash with Sura 5:51. This is, consequently, where Islamists – and 
not only the extremists – go wrong from Lessing’s point of view if they want to use Shari’ah 
law as a facet of political Islam for laying the foundation of the transitional process of an 
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entire nation because they view themselves as being in sole possession of the ultimate truth 
which they (ideally) have to make everyone accept – and the more conservative they are, the 
more they go wrong. 
 
The historical background to the Ring Parable 
 
The above could be seen as yet another Christian or Western attempt to prove the inferiority 
of Islam as a model for living in the 21
st
 century. While there are undoubtedly in my view 
insurmountable conceptual clashes between a traditional political Islam and an open secular 
society as we currently understand it, the point of setting out Lessing’s play here is that its 
underlying theme is not new and possibly not even Christian or Western: There had been 
previous versions of the theme behind the ring parable, and according to some scholars
74
 
some of the earliest ones may actually have come from Muslim writers or portrayed Muslims 
as accepting that they share a hope with the other religions, rather than a certainty. Three of 
those shall be looked at more closely here
75
. 
 
The first story is set in the late 8
th
 century in Baghdad and concerns a religious conversation 
between the Caliph al-Mahdi, known for his inner-Islamic persecution of Muslim heretics, 
and the Nestorian Patriarch Timothy I. The textual source for this narration is Christian, but 
there appears to be no reason to think that the Muslim side’s stance had been misrepresented 
by the author. The Caliph and the Patriarch engage in a lengthy theological discussion ending 
in a stalemate of arguments. The Patriarch then tells the Caliph the Parable of the Pearl
76
:  
 
“...in this world we are all as in a dark house in the middle of the night. If at night and in this 
dark house a precious pearl were to drop by chance among the people and all were to become 
aware of its existence, everyone would try to pick up the pearl. Not everyone would have it, 
but only one. While one may have the pearl itself, another may have a piece of glass, a third 
one a piece of rock or a clot of dirt, but everyone will be happy and proud to be the real holder 
of the pearl.”  
 
The Patriarch goes on to state that with the dawn the true owner of the pearl would become 
known, and he would be happy and all the others sad and dismayed; in that sense the story 
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remains behind the ambition of Lessing’s version described above. However, the Caliph then 
reminds the Patriarch that “in this world, the owners of the pearl are unknown”, a remarkable 
admission in itself for a Muslim, to which the Patriarch replies that one can know them in 
part, namely through “good deeds and pious action”. The Caliph ends the dispute by saying 
“we have hope in God that we are the owners of the pearl and that we hold it in our hands”. 
Kuschel emphasises the use of the word “hope”, which by necessity denotes the acceptance 
that there is no certainty
77
. 
 
The second example is set again in Baghdad, this time in the 10
th
 century, and is related by a 
man called Abu Sulaiman. The story concerns a sceptic who states that his scepticism is 
based on the realisation that all religions have equal claim and arguments. When asked why 
he then still adheres to his own religion, he recounts the Parable of the Caravanserai
78
:   
 
“I am like a man who went into a caravanserai to ...seek refuge in the shade on a sunny day. 
The landlord of the caravanserai brought him to a room without asking whether he liked it. 
While he stayed there, lo!, a cloud came and it began to pour down. In his room it began to 
leak from the ceiling and he looked for other rooms, but found that they also leaked. The yard 
of the house was covered in mud. So he decided that it was best to stay in his room, be at rest 
and not get his feet muddy by walking through the yard in order to find another room. ... So 
also I: I was born without reason, and then my parents brought me into this religion without 
me having the opportunity to test it beforehand. When I did I found that it worked like all the 
others and that it behoved me better to remain in it, rather than to disown it; because I could 
only have given it up and chosen another one by adopting the latter and preferring it to the 
former. However, I did not find any argument for the latter without immediately finding an 
argument that another could have held against it.”  
 
This example proceeds from human skepticism about our capacity of finding “the” truth. 
Here, the loyalty to one’s own “inherited” religion is based on the absence of a better 
alternative
79, a theme reminiscent of Nathan’s question about how we can distrust our own 
forefathers’ traditions or ask others to distrust theirs. However, as was already indicated 
above, in order to be able to ask that question, we must first subject our own religion to the 
scrutiny through the eyes of others. 
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The third example is that of Ibn Arabi, a Muslim mystic who spent the first part of his life in 
Muslim Spain in the 12
th
 century and who died in Damascus in 1240. His attitude is brought 
out in one of his poems, and is based on mystical love
80
: 
 
“My heart has made room for any shape of faith. 
It is a pasture for Indian wisdom, 
a monastery for Christian monks, 
a temple for idols, 
a Ka’aba for a Muslim pilgrim, 
the tables of the Torah 
and the scroll of the Qur’an. 
In religion, I am a follower of mystical love! 
Whatever path its camels take! 
There is my religion and my faith!”  
 
It is difficult to imagine Ibn Arabi reciting this poem today and not being considered a heretic 
by the Islamists. As Kuschel points out
81
, Ibn Arabi, himself a devout Muslim, did not 
advocate the equality of all religions as such, but more likely wanted to express his own 
higher state of religious enlightenment. Nonetheless, one may read this poem of Ibn Arabi as 
an insight into the nature of God as all-encompassing love. Research on Lessing’s literary 
knowledge has found distinct interrelations between Lessing’s thought with the writings of 
the time of Al-Andalus and of such path-breaking philosophers as Ibn Tufail and Ibn 
Rushd
82
. These are only three examples, but they should signify clearly that in the earlier 
days of Islam, there was room for hope instead of certainty, and by implication, room for 
doubt instead of blinkered fanaticism. Today’s believers of all faiths need to remember that 
certainty of transmission does not increase with distance in time from the original source. 
 
Lessing’s reception in Islam 
 
The picture here, as far as one can see from reports about
83
 the reception in Western media 
and literature, seems rather sporadic. A translation into Arabic by a Christian Arab, Ilias 
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Nasr-Allah Haddad, already existed in 1932, and since 2005 we have at least one other new 
translation, by Fawziya Hasan
84
. The 1932 version by Haddad uses an archaic form of Arabic 
which is hard to understand for the average reader of today, the 2005 translation by Hasan is 
apparently incorrect in many instances, in some cases it even distorts the meaning and seems 
to have been written with Islamic sensitivities in mind, for example, by renaming it “The 
Three Rings“ for fear of offending a Muslim audience by attributing wisdom to a Jew85. A 
2010 German PhD thesis by the Iraqi Zahim Mohammed Muslim engages in a study of 
Lessing’s discourse with Islam86 and theatre productions in the wake of 9/11 but has little to 
say about the reception of Nathan the Wise in the Islamic world. Similarly, David G John
87
 
wrote about productions of Nathan in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in the 1990s, with mixed 
results. Kuschel refers to productions in Karachi, Pakistan, in 1995 as well as in Los Angeles 
in 1997 on the occasion of Mohammed’s birthday before a Muslim audience88. A more 
recent, undated and brief paper by Abdullah Aldamagh at the Geman Department of the 
University of Damascus
89
, which refers to the thesis by Muslim mentioned above, positively 
mentions the fact that Lessing used the literal translation of “Islam“ for his words 
“Ergebenheit in Gott“ (submission to God's will), yet the author expresses understandable 
astonishment that it took 217 years for this significant fact to register in the Western 
literature, a sign of a lack of familiarity in Western literary studies with basic concepts of 
Islam. What seems to be missing is literature that engages in depth with the substance of 
Lessing’s project from a theological and political rather than from a literary, theatrical, 
sociological, historical or anthropological point of view.  
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Conclusion  
 
We have tried to put the current resurgence of Islamist thinking into perspective in the Arab 
transition context, and elsewhere in the wider Muslim world, at the example of an increase in 
more fundamentalist approaches to religious and ethical practices. The problem that faces the 
reformers who often initiated the transition process for political reasons but without major 
religious overtones, namely students and intellectuals, as well as the Western support 
organisations who want to influence the process towards a more secular understanding of the 
rule of law, is not so much the theory of Islam and of Shari’ah, although there are certain 
issues which will always cause friction with theoretical Western or secular views. It is the 
disconnect between the representation of the theory in the cross-cultural and transreligious 
discourse and the practice of Islam, not infrequently a practice based on half-knowledge and 
inflexibility, resulting in the danger of a unilateral imposition of the Islamist position on all 
people in the region on the basis of what is perceived and presented as “divine“ command. 
The political reason for the re-Islamisation is often sought in the colonial history and the 
denigration of Islam over the centuries by the West and the colonial powers. Islamist 
approaches to reform are thus seen as an expression of cultural and religious self-
determination in what is perceived to be “one’s own global corner“. Concerns of non-Muslim 
regional minorities or less radical Muslims are discounted based on idealised conceptions of 
the ethical foundations, advantages, functions and powers of Islam and in particular of the 
Shari’ah as an intellectually perfect construct – an idealisation frequently not borne out by 
everyday practice. Inflexibility can, however, also be a sign of insecurity or perceived lack of 
options and a reflexive response to criticism from outside, “outside“ here also encompassing 
proponents of a moderate or even disestablished Islam. The paper has tried to highlight the 
problematic relationship between the traditional Arab/Muslim religious thinking when it 
comes to the role of Qur’an, Sunna and Shari’ah and the general cognition patterns that exist 
based on the submission to untested family, ethnic and intellectual traditions, some of which 
may reach back to pre-Islamic times. Yet, they may have become a – now mostly unreflected 
– part of mainstream Muslim behaviour and rationalisation patterns through the functions of 
ritual and daily practice. 
 
We have interrogated some examples of current Muslim attitudes to interfaith engagement 
with Christianity – whose adherents enjoys special status as  people of the book – and found 
that even in prima facie expressions of good will, such as the 2007 Common Word, there are 
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undercurrents of an unflinching dogmatism. This dogmatism has been traced to a concern that 
traditional Islamic thinking is not able or willing to accept the need for self-scrutiny based on 
external frames of reference, rather than on the axiomatic stance that both the Qur’an and the 
Sunna are ultimately exempt from human intellectual critique and investigation because of 
their alleged divine and quasi-divine nature. External historical-critical research that 
questions these fundamental assumptions is discouraged among Muslim scholars or even 
receives hostile attention. This in turn leads to an undesirable situation where it is mostly 
non-Muslim scholars – or Muslims academically socialised in the West – in fields such as 
comparative literature, religion or law, often pejoratively meta-classified as “Orientalism“, 
who engage in the study of the creation and development of the Qur’an and the Sunnah and 
the impact that may have on the claim of Islam as the final revelation, with all the 
consequences this stance has entailed over the last 1,400 years. These “outsiders“ are in my 
experience routinely dismissed as lacking the necessary linguistic or cultural knowledge, for 
example, because they have not undergone the classical training for Muslim religious and 
legal scholars. While there may undoubtedly be some merit in that contention, it allows the 
traditionalists to deflect any sincere offer of cross-cultural conversation with the knock-down 
argument of lack of peer equality in the dialogue, even in cases where no such education 
inequality exists or where the non-traditional point of view might yield new insights. This 
attitude impliedly presupposes that anything which comes from outside and/or from an 
unconventional source is per se untrustworthy and scholarly flawed bid’ah.  
 
In the context of a transitional scenario from the 12
th
 century, Lessing’s play Nathan the Wise 
was juxtaposed to the Islamist and traditionalist Islamic religious psychology, in order to 
show that there are ways of living one’s own religion while accepting and not merely 
tolerating the potential validity of those of others. The important point to be made was firstly 
that Lessing wrote the piece with a decidedly pro-Islamic intention and based on his rather 
extensive knowledge – for his time – of Islam. Secondly, he could refer to previous versions 
of the narration which were set in a Muslim environment themselves. Thirdly, it was set in a 
scenario which would these days count as a post-conflict situation and can, fourthly, thus give 
an example of how to approach the matter of religious diversity in the pursuit of the Arab 
transition which will in all likelihood also be an Islamic transition. Current events in Egypt, 
Tunisia, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere do not allow for any reasonably safe prediction of how 
this transition will unfold. So far it seems that regrettably a reporter from Al-Jazeera, who 
visited Durham University some years ago, is being proven right in that he said that the 
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Islamic reformation will take a long time and cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of 
people. One would hope that the Muslims can learn from the mistakes committed during the 
Christian reformation and be wiser for it. Reza Aslan, an Iranian Muslim and author, writes in 
his “No God but God“: 
 
“Ultimately, an Islamic democracy must be concerned not with reconciling popular and divine 
sovereignty, but with reconciling ‘people’s satisfaction with God’s approval‘...And if ever there is a 
conflict between the two, it must be the interpretation of Islam that yields to the reality of democracy, 
not the other way around. It has always been this way. ... Now [Islam] must evolve once more.  
... When fourteen centuries ago Muhammad launched a revolution in Mecca, ... [i]t took many years of 
violence and devastation to cleanse the Hijaz of its “false idols“. It will take many more to cleanse 
Islam of its new false idols – bigotry and fanaticism – worshipped by those who have replaced 
Muhammad’s original vision of tolerance and unity with their own ideals of hatred and discord. But the 
cleansing is inevitable, and the tide of reform cannot be stopped. The Islamic Reformation is already 
here. We are all living in it.“90 
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